The Evolution of Bolsonarism: Qualitative analysis of the perceptions of Bolsonaro’s electorate in 2019 and 2020
Esther Solano Gallego
Esther Solano Gallego: PhD in Social Sciences from Universidad Complutense de Madrid and professor at the Federal University of Sao Paulo.
Introduction
Over the last few years I have dedicated myself to studying Jair Bolsonaro’s electoral base. I carried out my first qualitative research with supporters of the then congressman in October 2017, in which we observed his symbolic strength as an emerging political character. After the 2018 elections, my colleague Camila Rocha (CEBRAP) and I decided to further analyze Bolsonaro’s electorate on a continuing basis. We have primarily chosen to analyze his moderate voters, who are not averse to dialog with the opposition, as opposed to his radical supporters, whose reason and emotions are blocked by their own radicalism. Our goal is to understand how these voters think given that they cast their ballots in favor of the former captain of the army in 2018 but frequently reject his violence and authoritarianism. Many of them had even voted for progressive candidates and parties in previous elections, especially the Workers Party (or PT, in the Portuguese acronym).
Our methodological choice of focusing on moderate Bolsonaro voters is based on a hypothesis that has been repeatedly confirmed: these voters are open to dialog and their political views are marked by a sense of abandonment and/or orphanhood. Therefore, our study is based on a sociological reflection that aims at delving deeper into theoretical and conceptual analyses with a view to defining the phenomenon of Bolsonarism. Our research is also based on a well-defined political stance: a wish to engage in dialog of those who have been portrayed as enemies in an artificial, electorally-biased fashion by the current president of Brazil over the past few years. If the democratic arena is to be rebuilt — as a prerequisite for any potential dialog — it is essential that we become familiar with the opponents’ viewpoint, a proximity that is critical for the future of the country and democracy.
Unhappy with the PT administration and the political system as a whole, these voters felt represented by Bolsonaro’s anti-establishment, anti-corruption, anti-left, military, patriotic rhetoric, which is also grounded in family, order, and morality values. In 2017 and 2018 (before the elections), we clearly saw a rise in the conservative electoral base that up until that moment had not felt loyally represented by any viable previous candidate. Not only did Bolsonaro lend his name to this movement, but also gave space, voice, and priority to political options and behaviors that had not been included in the predominant public arena during the 14 years of PT rule (from January 1st, 2003 through August 31, 2016, when Dilma Rousseff was impeached). Contrary to what a more superficial analysis may suggest, Bolsonaro did not establish himself as a political alternative based solely on the unpopularity of the PT administration and attacks against political differences and ideological opponents, but mainly on the construction of an entire ideological and emotional set of beliefs that embraced millions of Brazilians who had not felt represented yet. The disappointment at the PT, the disbelief in the Brazilian political system as a whole, the then-powerful anti-corruption narrative of the Car Wash Operation, and an acute economic crisis paved the way for the emergence and empowerment of this political phenomenon.
However, as early as 2019, the first year of the current government, many of Bolsonaro’s moderate voters became critical of the president on significant aspects, especially due to his inappropriate behavior as the nation’s leader and the sense of instability associated with his style of government. Throughout 2020, Bolsonaro’s management of the Covid-19 pandemic added to the list of reasons for criticism. We then began to classify our interviewees, all of whom voted for Bolsonaro in 2018, in three categories: “loyal”, “critical”, and “regretful”.
This article is the result of a number of interviews that started in 2017, but I chose three more recent field studies to better exemplify the changes in the perceptions of Bolsonaro’s electoral base over the two first years of the current government. The methodology adopted in our studies is always qualitative, and we interviewed the participants in ethnographic mini focus groups in meetings of over 100 minutes. To know more technical details, please refer to the Annex at the end of this text.
In the first study, we held in-person interviews with middle-low and low-income Bolsonaro voters from Porto Alegre (State of Rio Grande do Sul) in May 2019. The second study was held online with the same profile of interviewees from the city of São Paulo in May 2020. The third, held in October 2020, was also an online interview, but this time with middle-high and high-income voters from the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In the second and third studies, we used the three-tier classification (loyal, critical, and regretful) to better understand the narrative differences across the three profiles. The groups were gender-homogenous and we also grouped together people with similar ages and religious profiles. The first study (2019) gives us an overview of the fundamental elements of Bolsonarism, while the second and third studies allow us to delve deeper into issues related to the novel Coronavirus pandemic and more contextual and critical aspects of the second year of the president’s administration.
Group 1: Porto Alegre, 21 interviewees, March 2019. In-person. Funded by Tide Setúbal Foundation.
Group 2: São Paulo, 9 interviewees, May 2020. Google Meet. Loyal, critical, and regretful voters. Funded by Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
Group 3: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 30 interviewees, October 2020. Google Meet. Loyal, critical, and regretful voters. Funded by Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
Bolsonaro as a response to the political crisis: anti-establishment, anti-partisanship, and anti-PT sentiments
Like other far-right politicians, Bolsonaro established himself as a presidential candidate based on the escape-goat logic, by turning the fear, insecurity, anger, and frustration of the poorest — and also of the traditional middle classes that were growing poorer — into political hatred. The political ethos of the far right thrives on the dialectics of the construction and destruction of an enemy that is exaggerated to the extreme and kept alive as a dangerous threat that looms over the collective subjectivity of the population. According to this logic, the Workers Party (PT, in the Portuguese acronym) is to blame for the malaise in the Brazilian society, cultural Marxism, teachers indoctrinating students, and feminists or LGBT leaders trying to dismantle the traditional social order. This rhetoric is enshrined in the myth that the country was safer in the past, when social hierarchies were well defined and respected by all. It is the “politics of enmity” (Mbeme, 2018).
One of the most frequent reasons given by our interviewees to explain why they voted for Bolsonaro (even in the most recent interviews) is that he was “different”, an outsider, and more importantly, an anti-establishment leader capable of fighting a completely corrupt political system. The words “hope” or “change” associated with Bolsonaro came up in most interviews that Camila Rocha and I have conducted so far. It is important to note that the interviewees seem oblivious to the mismatch between the fact that the former captain is actually an old-school politician and his image as a political outsider. The main sentiment that we detected in this regard is that Bolsonaro is “different from the others.” Traditional political parties are perceived as indistinct, physiological, and concerned with their own privileges, whereas Bolsonaro did not fall for the intrinsic logic of corruption in politics and remained loyal to his principles. According to our respondents, during his seven consecutive terms as a Lower House representative, he never condoned corrupt practices. And his intolerance for corruption is precisely why Bolsonaro had a lackluster performance in his history as congressman from 1991 to 2018, when he was elected president. His mediocre career as a lawmaker is therefore reinterpreted as the propriety of a person who is so righteous that he would not bend to the dishonest practices of his peers. It is clear therefore that corruption is at the core of such contempt for the political system. Not only are professional politicians “dirty and crooked,” but political action itself sparks negative feelings, including shame and rejection.
“They’re all the same. The Workers Party [PT], the Social Democratic Party [PSDB]. Power is power. They don’t care about us. They are all corrupt, everybody… I don’t vote for the left or right, I vote for the person. Oh, I think Bolsonaro is different and he can change all that. We believe in him. We have faith in him, that he will make things better.” (Male, 35, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income, March 2019)
“I used to think the PSDB was the opposition, but it actually never was the opposition; it is clear to me now that this was a broader scheme created in the past, and now Bolsonaro came and messed with that scheme.” (Male, 47, loyal supporter, middle-high/high income, October, 2020).
Looking back at the studies I conducted together with Pablo Ortellado and Lucia Nader during the pro-impeachment demonstrations in 2015, the “social Bolsonarization” was already evident. In the demonstration against the PT that took place on Paulista Avenue, in Sao Paulo, on August 16, 2015, 96% of the demonstrators interviewed by our team said that they were not happy about the political system; 73% said that they did not trust political parties; and 70% said that they did not trust politicians. Anti-partisanship and the rejection of traditional political figures were already gaining momentum. When we asked which political leader inspired the most trust, Jair Bolsonaro’s name already ranked first: 19.4% of respondents trusted him a lot. When asked about political parties, only 11% of those present at the demonstration said they trusted the PSDB and 1% trusted the party known then as the PMDB. We also asked “who could solve the crisis in Brazil?” and gave respondents some alternatives. Fifty-six percent said they fully or partially agreed that the crisis would be resolved by handing power “to someone outside the political game,” 64% to “an honest judge,” and 88% to an “honest politician.”
In online interviews conducted in May 2020 with participants from São Paulo, their views on the recent resignation by former judge Sérgio Moro from the position of Minister of Justice and Public Security in April were divided. Most described him as a judge who at the time of the Car Wash Operation seemed to have genuine intentions to fight corruption, a judge who wanted to “clean up the country” and therefore had a “mission” that was critical for the future of Brazil. However, Bolsonaro’s supporters, especially the loyal ones, believe that by leaving the government Moro was opportunistic and willing to do whatever it took to advance in his career, and that he was only seeking his own benefit, betraying the president’s trust. Some even said that Moro had been sent to “infiltrate the government” and that his leaving the Ministry was a positive thing. The notion that the former judge strayed from his original mission when he left the judiciary and joined the government, carried away by his ambition, is also present in the less critical interviewees’ answers. Some interviewees, on the other hand, criticized Bolsonaro for trying to interfere with the Federal Police to prevent potential corruption investigations involving his sons, which led to Sérgio Moro’s departure from the Ministry of Justice. In the opinion of these respondents, his interference was intolerable as it is incompatible with the image of a president who pledged to fiercely fight corruption in his campaign.
“I’m not a fan of Moro’s, but I think he’s a good person. They used one another; Moro used Bolsonaro as well as Bolsonaro used Moro.” (Male, 45, critical supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“It was like Moro was sent by the media to infiltrate the government. I was very surprised with Moro, I thought he was honest, we thought he was honest. I felt deceived by him. It was a stab in the back. Moro was an opportunist. I had doubts about Bolsonaro at first, but then we realized he was right because Moro was sending information to Rede Globo [Brazilian TV network]. Moro didn’t want to investigate the guy who stabbed Bolsonaro, but he investigated Marielle’s case. Moro showed lack of character, he did it to get elected.” (Female, 27, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“So one of the things I regret the most is his authoritarianism regarding how he’s meddled in the investigations, I didn’t expect that. I didn’t think that would be our problem. We already knew that he was controversial, but that he was going to meddle in the police the way he did, and Moro leaving the way he did, it was the end for me.” (Female, 53, regretful, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
“The way he left was not honorable. It wasn’t a dignified move on his part.” (Male, 50, loyal supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
To Bolsonaro’s loyal supporters, his difficulty in governing is mostly attributed to “media and congressional boycotts” against his administration. In their view, Brazil was on “a good path” after Bolsonaro took office in 2019, compared to previous administrations; Bolsonaro genuinely wants to do a good job, and claims that “people don’t let the man work” are frequent. According to them, the president is continually harassed and prevented from governing, which forces him to spend all his time defending himself. The novel coronavirus is said to have exacerbated this situation even further: according to the respondents, when the country was just starting to tread the right path, the pandemic paralyzed all changes that were underway, hiding their positive outcomes. To critical supporters who feel disappointed, Bolsonaro was not living up to expectations, but they frequently claim as an excuse that he is honest, authentic, genuine, and is indeed struggling on many fronts in his current administration.
“Let the man work. Compared with what we went through for umpteen years, what we have today is fine with me. Not much can be done, you can’t change much in such little time, it’s not like you can make 50 years’ worth of change in only 5.” (Male, 32, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“My assessment (of Bolsonaro’s administration) is positive. The ideologies he defends — family, religion, values, ethics, civility — and the fact he is not corrupt won my vote. My assessment of him is great. I understand that on many things he may have to change his stance, not because he wants to, but because he has to, otherwise he won’t be able to govern. I’m very happy with him, I didn’t expect less from him.” (Male, 58, loyal supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Authenticity is perhaps the main value that subjectively underlies Bolsonaro’s figure. To his loyal supporters, the way the president addresses the public aggressively and controversially is seen as positive as it shows that Bolsonaro is authentic and that he does not let himself get carried away by the publicity and dishonesty associated with old politics. The violence in his rhetoric is reinterpreted as authenticity, which is one of the most desirable values in a political context that is perceived as corrupt and deceitful.
“So, come on, let the man govern, let him curse away! He is a buffoon, yes, he is, but plenty of people came before him and used nice, pretty words, but didn’t do shit besides stealing our money!” (Male, 32, loyal supporter, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I thought he was truthful. Although he could say some things that were strong, some things that were wrong, I thought he was not pretending to be someone he wasn’t, which other candidates seemed to be doing.” (Female, 30, critical supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“Across all crises, Bolsonaro showed that he is firm, that he is honest.” (Male, 40, loyal supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
There are limits, however, to the extent to which Bolsonaro’s brutality is seen as a symbol of authenticity among his electorate. Interviewees who felt disappointed at the president speak of Bolsonaro’s attitude — described as “rude” and “coarse” — as a source of instability in the government. According to his more critical supporters and those who regret having voted for the former military officer, Bolsonaro’s behavior is extremely negative and incompatible with the decorum and liturgy that the presidency demands.
“I think everything, this chaos, is a little bit his fault, yes. Many things could have been avoided, he likes to stir up controversy, pick up fights, but he has to think things through, because it’s not about him anymore, it’s about a nation.” (Female, 59, critical supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“He has no class. We are human beings and we always try to have empathy for other human beings, but not him, he curses, he doesn’t really care. He should have more culture, he should learn how to be a president.” (Female, 47, regretful, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Other sources of the instability that causes multiple cabinet changes, according to some respondents, are Bolsonaro’s authoritarian behavior and his deal with the so-called Centrão bloc (group of congresspeople who fall at the center of the political spectrum) in mid-2020. The most loyal supporters do not see any problems in the fact that Bolsonaro has dismissed ministers and say that, as president, he can change his cabinet however he pleases and should have people who he trusts on his side. To the ones that feel disappointed, the multiple cabinet changes are the result of excessive intransigence on the president’s part, who won’t take anyone who disagrees with him and whose reputation and ability to govern are increasingly compromised.
“This is how I think: you’re the boss in your house, so you know everything that happens there. If you’re the CEO of your company, you have to know everything that happens in your company… So the boss has to know everything. You have to surround yourself with good people, but you need information.” (Male, 56, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“He is intransigent. The two health ministers left because they are doctors and didn’t agree with the things Bolsonaro says. Bolsonaro, in his military ways, doesn’t know how to deal with criticism and made their lives a living hell until they quit.” (Female, 52, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
On Bolsonaro’s negotiations for funds and government positions with the Centrão bloc, which for many is synonymous with Brasilia’s corrupt politics, respondents also have conflicting views. Most are suspicious about Bolsonaro’s move towards quid pro quo politics, and say the proximity with the Centrão bloc is a betrayal of the principles of honesty and the anti-corruption stance that led Bolsonaro to the presidency. According to these supporters, he will end up “cutting his own throat.” Others however, although uncomfortable with this situation, believe that “this is the only way to keep governability” and therefore “compromises with the Centrão are necessary.”
“Everyone has to negotiate and get closer to those who think differently because no one can govern alone.” (Female, 45, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020).
“If he really does that, it’ll be the beginning of the end for him, because he would be cutting his own throat.” (Male, 35, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020).
“I think someone should throw a bomb at the Centrão. He has to form a coalition, that’s politics, politics is exactly that, you have to know to create connections, you need to give something to get something else. That to me is wrong.” (Male, 40, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
One thing all respondents agree on is that Bolsonaro’s sons get in the way of their father’s government, often being described as “childish” or “unprepared.” Bolsonaro’s coarse way of governing may even be tolerated or condoned, but his sons are seen as inappropriate and suspects of illegal activities. Statements such as “I don’t trust them completely” and “there’s something fishy there” came up frequently. That Bolsonaro’s sons stay clear from government affairs is therefore desired by all interviewees. Most of them do not believe that Bolsonaro’s image of an honest politician can be tarnished by corruption investigations involving his sons, but many say that there should be a clearer separation between the president and the father, the public interest prevailing over the family’s.
“He’s not there to stand up for his son, he’s there to stand up for a nation, and he’s behavior is not of one who’s standing up for a nation. When you take the president’s seat, you don’t have four sons and a wife anymore, you have a nation to take care of, we are his family.” (Male, 45, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“But there are some things that I’m uncomfortable with and that I find hard to defend. His son has some issues, I think this is causing problems and it will cause many problems, because people will look into them and it will be hard to get away with it.” (Male, 34, loyal supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Anti-PT and anti-leftism
Besides the repudiation of politics as a collective activity, anti-leftism was one of the elements Bolsonaro exploited the most in his campaign. One of the most interesting facts on a symbolic level was the resurgence of anti-communism in electoral propaganda. The link between anti-PT, anti-leftism and anti-communism sentiments was, and still is, a symbolic construct with enormous potential for social reverberation. In the first campaign advertisements for the second round of the 2018 elections, Bolsonaro’s ads showed alleged connections between the PT and the São Paulo Forum — an organization formed by Latin American and Caribbean left-wing political parties and organizations — , broadcasting on TV and audio clip of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva celebrating its creation in São Paulo in 1990. According to Bolsonaro’s presidential campaigns, the Forum is “a political group with a leftist-communist ideology led by Lula and Fidel Castro” created in Latin America at the same time as “Europe was being freed of communism.” In parallel, the video reaffirmed the relationship between the PT and Venezuela (which was governed at the time by Nicolás Maduro, Hugo Chávez’s successor after his death in 2013) and the other “Bolivarian countries” and the danger of “Brazil becoming a new Venezuela” if the PT won the elections for the fifth time. The old rhetoric of the red scare and the ghost of communism invaded the media once again. An ominous presence during the 2015 and 2016 pro-impeachment demonstrations, the anti-PT movement emerged as a preferred electoral tool used to reinforce an alleged symbiosis between the left, social disorder, and a threatened nation.
“I didn’t vote for Bolsonaro for what he is, I voted for Bolsonaro in spite of what he is. So for me there is a difference between voting for Bolsonaro for what he is, for what he said, and voting for him in spite of all that. Because for me, ‘in spite of’ means I had no other option. I didn’t want the PT to win, I don’t want the PT to win ever again, and I saw in him a possibility to defeat the PT. And I voted for him, and I didn’t like it. I don’t like the extremism, and how he acts like he alone knows the truth, like he’s always right, how he never listens to anybody, how he dealt with the pandemic in the beginning, the mockery. How his sons are not under investigation. Moro’s resignation was also very painful to me because I like Moro. I regret it, but I don’t know if I would do things differently because of the PT.” (Female, 53, regretful, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
“After everything that happened in the Car Wash Operation, I won’t vote for any socialist party anymore. Is the party socialist? Does it stand for socialist beliefs and ideologies? Then I won’t vote for it… They keep talking about socialism, but they are filthy rich. They own pick-up trucks, farms, they live in huge apartments, they own apartments in Paris.” (Male, 42, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Professor Mara Telles and her research team studied this phenomenon at a pro-impeachment demonstration on March 12, 2015, in Belo Horizonte (Telles, 2017). On that occasion, the demonstrators stated that they were expressing their indignation at corruption (36%) and also their dissatisfaction with politics (18%), and demanding president Dilma Rousseff’s and PT’s removal from office (16%). However, more than corruption, what connected the demonstrators the most was their anti-PT feelings: 91% stated that the PT was greatly harmful to the country, and 82% gave the PT a 0 score; 81% said that Lula was one of the main crooks in the country, and 81% said that Dilma was also one of the crooks. According to Professor Telles, the anti-PT movement is based on anti-egalitarianism and on a powerful “class factor”. Most people interviewed in Belo Horizonte disagreed with the social inclusion policies implemented by the PT, such as Bolsa Família (77.8%) — a social welfare program that provides financial aid to poor families — arguing that people living on welfare tend to “become lazier.” Thirty-seven percent of the demonstrators said that the black population, women, homosexuals, and other minorities have too many rights in Brazil, and 70.1% of the people interviewed defended the end of the public university quota system. The presence of Cuban doctors in primary health care programs in the poorest regions of the country was also opposed by 70.7% of the demonstrators. Almost two thirds (75.6%) of them said that the poor are ill-informed in their political decision-making, and that people from the Northeast region of Brazil are less politically-conscious than inhabitants of other regions of the country (59.3%).
But this antagonism is not targeted at the PT only. The image of the enemy is broad and encompasses the entire progressive agenda, especially the so-called “identity movements.” The Bolsonaro conservatism is built on a romantic, more orderly past and the protection of religious and traditional family values, continuously resorting to heteronormative relationships to reinforce the binary character of the good citizen, who fits in the conservative and meritocratic standards, as opposed to the immoral citizen, who is the opposite of such idealized image. The dynamic of cultural wars is reframing the current Brazilian crisis as a crisis of values, in which the traditional social structures are under attack by radical feminists, anti-family activists, the LGBT community, and a black population that abuses the quota system to increase their privileges, giving rise to “reverse racism.” Poor workers who do not “use” their identity as women, LGBT, or black people to obtain privileges in the labor market are allegedly harmed by a policy that puts some minorities’ identity agendas first to the detriment of the majority. “Victimization” and “lacração” — which means defending a cause, often a social cause and especially on social media, to get attention — are unanimously criticized by respondents and associated with groups that advocate for identity movements.
“I don’t like extremism in politics, I don’t like religious extremism, I don’t like feminist extremism. So when they do extreme things, I don’t consider myself a part of it.” (Female, 41, regretful, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
“I am anti-feminist. Feminists are radicals and want to end family values.” (Female, 32, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income, March 2019)
“What about domestic violence laws to protect us? And homophobia is a good thing for them, but what about us? We’re normal, we’re not snowflakes… If we call a fag a fag, they get offended and will defend themselves, but we can’t do the same. If you call a black person black, it’s the same thing. If you lay a finger on a woman, they have laws protecting them, what about us? Isn’t it about equal rights? The weakest go to the wall, and we are the weakest. There should be a law to protect us too.” (Male, 52, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income class, March 2019)
“I am against racial quotas. What about poor whites? There are rich blacks too. Racism exists, but there are more and more equal opportunities too. Some people abuse the fact that they are black and want to take advantage of it. Slavery was a long time ago; we shouldn’t be clinging onto that. There is racism on both sides” (Female, 29, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income, March 2019)
Bolsonaro as an answer to the moral crisis: the Christianization and militarization of politics
As a response to the moral crisis caused by systemic political corruption, the discontent over successive years of leftist governments, and a generalized social disorder, Bolsonaro proposes to bring back two set of values — religious and military — which, if adopted in the private and public arenas, would reinstate the traditional order that should not have been interrupted.
Bolsonaro frequently cites the Bible verse John 8:32: “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” Although he used to be a Catholic, Bolsonaro was baptized in the Jordan River by Evangelical Minister Everaldo, the president of the Social Christian Party (PSC, in the Portuguese acronym), on May 12, 2016. The word God ranked among the words most frequently mentioned by him in his campaign and inaugural address, on January 1, 2019, in Brasilia. A poll conducted by Datafolha on October 25, 2018 estimated the number of valid votes for Bolsonaro by religious segment: 29.9% of the votes came from Catholics and 21.7% from Evangelicals, compared to 28.7% of the valid votes for the PT candidate, Fernando Haddad, coming from Catholics and 9.7% from Evangelicals. The Evangelical universe, fundamentally Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal, positioned itself largely on Bolsonaro’s side after Bishop Edir Macedo (Universal Church of the Kingdom of God), a PT ally until the 2016 impeachment, and Bishop Silas Malafaia (Assemblies of God) publicly supported him.
Evangelical neoconservatism emerged in Brazil with political momentum especially after 2002 drawing on the belief that the traditional family is under threat and reviving the anti-communist debate. The Evangelical Parliamentary Front (FPE, in the Portuguese acronym) was created in 2003. Its influence and importance has only grown since, its history virtually coinciding with the almost 14 years of PT rule (2003–2016). Valle explains in his doctoral dissertation (2018) that, although there were differences between the PT and various Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal groups, the new aspect that presented itself in the 2014 presidential elections (when Rousseff was re-elected) and became stronger in the 2016 local elections and consolidated in the 2018 presidential elections (when Bolsonaro was elected) is the Evangelical ministers’ willingness to engage in a confrontational discourse against the PT in their churches. In his study on the Assemblies of God — Ministry of Belém, located in the neighborhood of Campo Limpo, in São Paulo, Valle affirms that the anti-PT discourse started to be verbalized more vehemently in 2014, especially after the controversies around the causes advocated by LGBT groups intensified and gained space in PT governments, and also because of the corruption investigations involving the party.
That change in attitude about the PT became noticeable in 2014 not only among the more influential Evangelical leaders but also among the members of their churches, including those who had voted for the PT in previous elections. They became increasingly disappointed at Rousseff’s administration (2011–2016), particularly because of the mounting economic crisis (starting in 2015), the prominence of the anti-corruption discourse (strengthened by the Car Wash Operation), and the rhetoric centered in family and Christian values (as a rection to the diversity agenda). On April 6, 2016, the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, also known as the Evangelical Caucus, declared its support for Rousseff’s impeachment and, out of the 81 Lower House Representatives that were members of that caucus, 75 voted for ousting the president.
To most of our respondents, especially the middle-low and low income ones, the role of religion as a regulator of social life is indispensable. According to them, one of the main reasons we are going through a “crisis of values” is the abandonment of fundamental ethical and religious principles. The re-emergence of religion as a moral compass for society is critical, they say. Interestingly, many interviewees criticized the members of the Bible Caucus and other religious leaders who are also politicians for “taking advantage of the Christian faith for personal and political purposes” that are not related in any way to the preservation and dissemination of the word of God in a morally corrupt society.
“I vote for Bolsonaro because he is pro-family, he is on the religious side. The PT wanted to make the gay kit, it was going to release prison inmates, and children would be able to choose if they want to be recognized as boys or girls in their birth certificate. It would be the downfall of family values. A mess. There was even that gay Bible thing. I’m glad Bolsonaro won because they were getting more powerful, children becoming gays… These people only think about sex, prostitution, orgies… Bolsonaro did something about it, he had courage… We are in a battle of God against the demons.” (Female, 22, Evangelical, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income, March 2019)
“What’s happening today is a total crisis of values. It’s all backwards. It’s all wrong. Television teaching to be gay. Children today don’t have the values that we had… Schools should teach religion, yes, so they can learn principles, know what is right and what is wrong.” (Female, 23, Evangelical, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income, March 2019)
In addition to the high value placed on religion, the military discourse is also appreciated by Bolsonaro’s supporters and it can be seen in the Congress makeup. According to research conducted by website Congresso em Foco in 2019 (when newly elected candidates took office together with Bolsonaro), the so-called Bullet Caucus, partially formed by former armed forces and military police officers, went from 36 to 102 members, 93 in the Lower House and 18 in Senate (the Caucus did not have any Senator in 2014). Most of them were members of the PSL (Bolsonaro’s party when he ran for president in 2018 and which formed the largest caucus in the Lower House that year). Additionally, 73 armed forces and military police officers were elected to state legislatures in 2018. In 2014, there were 18. According to our respondents, in a context of social chaos, there is an evident absence of the values that are common in the military ethos, such as discipline, authority, respect, and hierarchy, which are seen as imperative in an orderly society. “Order” is one of the most frequently mentioned concepts in our conversations, and the left is associated with chaos, disorder, and mess.
“Children are lazy nowadays. In the past we were raised with discipline at home and at school. We said ‘yes sir,’ there was respect, there was authority. Children knew adults were adults… I am in favor of military education, yes, singing the national anthem, the flag, because children should be taught to have responsibility, discipline, if not, this is what happens, this mess we live in today. Children now tell their parents they are going to call the Child Protection Service!” (Male, 34, Porto Alegre, middle-low/low income, March 2019)
“I’m not going to discuss whether they killed people (during the dictatorship regime), whether they did this or that, there’s no question. But what did they do with the country’s so-called democracy? With the so-called opening? All those who were against the dictatorship, most of them were arrested for corruption. Did the military commit excesses? In any regime there are good and bad people, but here’s the thing, they put the blame on the military. But what about the left-wing people in the Araguaia guerilla, and the people who killed soldiers in the headquarters of the army in Ibirapuera? What about those guys? Aren’t those guys political criminals? Are they innocent? They are allowed shoot and kill, just like Dilma robbed a bank. They can do this and that, and it’s okay? But the other side can’t?” (Male, 40, loyal supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
COVID-19
President Jair Bolsonaro’s attitude during the COVID-19 pandemic was widely criticized in the mini focus groups interviews across all three profiles (loyal, critical, and regretful), but especially by the latter, who were shocked by the president’s “insensitivity,” “mockery,” and “lack of empathy” for those infected and killed by the disease and their families. According to them, Bolsonaro crossed all lines when he continuously expressed what is perceived by the interviewees as a lack of compassion and humanity. To many of those who voted for him for his image as a “family man, a man of faith and character who would take care of Brazilians,” his attitude since the beginning of the pandemic, in March 2020, is assessed in general as inhumane and unacceptable.
“He mocks the dead; he laughs at the dead! I never thought I would see something like that!” (Female, 26, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I don’t like the extremism, and how he acts like he alone knows the truth, like he’s always right, how he never listens to anybody, how he dealt with the pandemic in the beginning, the mockery.” (Female, 39, regretful, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Most participants said that they are scared about the virus and that they were taking protection measures, such as wearing masks in public spaces and washing their hands with soap or hand sanitizers. The claim that the disease is nothing more than a “measly cold,” as Bolsonaro said, is rejected by virtually all interviewees, including his most loyal supporters. A significant part of the interviewees, especially the women, condemns his participation in demonstrations organized by his supporters during the pandemic, stating that “Bolsonaro was very irresponsible and set a terrible example to the population.”
“The disease is affecting the whole world, and this guy tells us that it’s a measly cold? If it were a measly cold, everybody would be cured by now, right?” (Male, 46, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“Bolsonaro was incoherent, he should have stayed at home, setting an example. How can the president be out there when everyone should stay at home? Bolsonaro acts as if everything is normal, but it isn’t. I don’t know if he knows something or if he has a screw loose, but he goes out there, kisses and hugs people, and he shouldn’t do that. I’m on his side, I support Bolsonaro 100%, but he showed a lack of coherence here, he should act as a president, not as a kid.” (Female, 45, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I think the guy is doing a good government, he is heavily attacked by the media. But he’s very stupid. Sometimes you want to punch him in the face. And for him to say all this nonsense: ‘It’s a measly cold’… But I would vote for him again, I would campaign for him again.” (Male, 32, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
“He may have had a negative influence on vaccination. There are things you shouldn’t say in a pandemic, like ‘Brazilians are weak, they’re sissies,’ these things could have been avoided, I’m not happy about that.” (Male, 48, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Respondents, however, do not take a strong stand on the social isolation measures advocated by doctors and scientists as a way to control the spread of the coronavirus. Several interviewees claim that a lockdown was in order in the beginning of the pandemic, but now it would make little sense, as it would only lead the country to an even more chaotic and unsustainable economic situation. The so-called vertical isolation — i.e. isolating vulnerable groups only — , defended at one point by the president, but rejected by experts and never put into practice, is seen by several interviewees as a more adequate way to control the pandemic, as it would reduce the economic impact of a more radical isolation or lockdown. Most respondents are sensitive to a dilemma that many see as unsolvable: saving lives or saving the economy? The impossible dichotomy between the economy and the preservation of health is present in almost every interview. Isolation is understood by many as a privilege of the upper middle class who can stay at home, in safety, while the poor cannot afford to do the same.
“I’m in favor of vertical isolation. Isolating everyone is very complicated because there’s an economic issue. What would happen then? The risk groups should be isolated and the rest would go to work, put on a mask, clean their hands, avoid crowding, we already know what to do to mitigate the risk; even at home, you can catch the virus. The economy has to move on.” (Male, 35, loyal supporter, middle-low/low income, São Paulo, May 2020)
“I wish I could stay at home, but I can’t, the bills aren’t going to pay themselves.” (Female, 45, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
The economic relief program, approved by Congress in March 2020 and implemented by the government in the following months, is viewed positively by all respondents, several of whom are beneficiaries themselves. When asked about who conceived the project, few were aware that it was a Congressional initiative that was later embraced by the government.
“Giving a poor family’s bread earner financial aid helps a lot, it’s little, but for many it will be a great help, I think it was a nice initiative from the government, although Brazil can afford to give much more.” (Male, 41, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I’m super in favor. Because I’ always hear people say, ‘you’re living off the government’s tit.’ But I think those receiving the aid really have no income.” (Female, 53, regretful, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Much like the unsolved equation of saving lives versus saving the economy, the narrative about the role played by an erratic management of the health and economic crisis brought about by the pandemic is being constructed. For now, what we have observed is that, although Bolsonaro is reprimanded for a crisis management that does not sit right with many, the governors and mayors are also heavily criticized. For many interviewees, they “make the pandemic political” and seek to take advantage of the crisis for their own benefit, not really caring about the well-being of the population. Given that this research was conducted during the pandemic and in São Paulo, the São Paulo governor, João Doria, was severely criticized. To most interviewees, Doria implemented a “sketchy isolation plan” in the state and his political acts were mainly aimed at making him a competitive candidate in the 2022 presidential elections. He was often described as an opportunistic, publicity-driven politician, who “uses nice words, but it’s all a pretense”, precisely the opposite of the image associated with Bolsonaro, who, they say, is “coarse but authentic”.
“I think he’s taking advantage of it, playing the good guy part to run for president.” (Male, 41, regretful, São Paulo, May 2020)
Impeachment and 2022 elections
To Bolsonaro’s loyal supporters, the president’s resignation or impeachment are out of question, unless new developments unfold and negatively hurt his image in a way that has not yet occurred. His disappointed voters, however, emphasize other reasons for Bolsonaro’s leaving the presidency, be it on his own initiative or by congressional decision. Some, despite supporting his resignation or impeachment, believe that if there is no evidence that he committed a ‘responsibility crime’ — which is the only circumstance in which a president can be impeached in Brazil — then there would be no grounds for his removal from office. However, if such evidence arises, they might change their opinion, they said. A frequent argument is that a change in the presidency amid a health crisis would not be beneficial to the country as it would add even more volatility to an already unstable political and economic scenario. The is also doubt around whether Bolsonaro’s removal or resignation would be the best option given the mistrust that Vice-president General Hamilton Mourão inspires in most of our interviewees. Many also mentioned former president Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment. They affirm that, although they were in favor of her impeachment in 2016, it only caused frustration and a “great national trauma” that led to an even worse situation than before. Those who are more emphatically in favor of Bolsonaro’s impeachment argue that the president’s irresponsibility in his handling of the pandemic resulted in a dramatic increase in the country’s death toll.
“Resigning would be cowardice. There are no grounds for impeachment.” (Male, 56, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I am in favor of removing him from office because the lives of Brazilians are more important, but first I would need to better assess Mourão to see if he would be a better fit than him, because in Dilma’s case the vice-president was worse.” (Female, 26, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I don’t know. Mourão would become the president. What would happen then? I don’t know what the consequences could be.” (Female, 47, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Finally, we asked our interviewees about the possible choices for the 2022 elections. They have a variety of different opinions. The most loyal ones say that, despite the mistakes and frustrations, they would vote again for Bolsonaro as he still is “the only honest politician” and they still feel greatly attached to the anti-PT logic. In a potential second round between Bolsonaro and Lula, several interviewees said they would unquestionably vote for Bolsonaro again.
“He is still the only politician who has a clean record. After all this time investigating him, he is the most investigated politician ever, they have nothing on him.” (Male, 36, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“If I had to choose now, I don’t know, I’m at a loss, I placed all my bets on Jair and was let down, there’s no one else I can think of that could take his place. If I had to choose between Bolsonaro and the PT, I would vote for Bolsonaro, I am anti-PT, we can’t take the PT anymore.” (Male, 41, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I would never vote for them (PT) again. For me, the only thing the PT did was to create Bolsa Família to win votes. I don’t like them, I don’t like the party, to me they’re all liars… I would only choose the PT in an election to abolish a party, only then would they have my vote.” (Male, 40, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
When asked about another right or center-right option, as mentioned earlier, our interviewees mistrust the governor of São Paulo, João Doria, a potential PSDB candidate. TV presenter Luciano Huck is described as a man with positive values and who conveys a good image, but he is not considered suitable for politics. Finally, Sérgio Moro and Ciro Gomes are mentioned as options, but with little enthusiasm.
Only the regretful or more critical Bolsonaro voters said that voting for the PT would be an option in 2022 as “a tactical vote to get Bolsonaro out of the presidential seat.” Interestingly, many participants who said they voted for Bolsonaro in 2018 to prevent PT’s return to power now admit there is a chance they will vote for the PT in 2022 to evict Bolsonaro from the Planalto Palace.
“I’ve always liked Luciano Huck, but I wouldn’t vote for him, I don’t think he’s the right guy for that. For now, I’ll stick with Bolsonaro until the end, until he’s impeached or something else happens, otherwise it’s all speculations, rumors, so I’ll stick with him until the end. I’ll vote for anything but the PT…not anything, I tend to lean to the right, so I wouldn’t vote for the PSOL. If I had to choose between the PT and the PSOL, I would annul my vote, sell my house and get out of this country.” (Male, 35, loyal supporter, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020).
“I would vote for Moro. And it’s not that I trust him, it’s just that I would have to vote for someone, and I wouldn’t vote for Bolsonaro. I would vote for Ciro. If I had known it would be like this, I would have voted for him. Or even for the PT.” (Male, 46, regretful, São Paulo, middle-low/low income, May 2020)
“I wouldn’t vote for him (Moro), I don’t think he has the right profile to be the president. He left the government on a low note and now he’s working for Odebrecht, I think he got lost. He used to be a national hero.” (Male, 42, critical supporter, middle-high/high income, October 2020)
Conclusions
A continued qualitative study allows us to clearly observe that Bolsonarism was built on elements that are firmly consolidated in the Brazilian social structures. That is why when we present the results of our interviews we usually reiterate that the Bolsonarism phenomenon is larger than Bolsonaro himself. It means that, even after the current president leaves the presidential seat in an electoral defeat or otherwise, several issues that pervade the Brazilian social-political setting must be addressed by politicians, institutions, and society itself to prevent an increase in the vulnerabilities of our democracy and new attacks to our democratic system. A deeper understanding of the structural vectors of one of the most disquieting phenomena of the recent Brazilian political history is critical.
This set of studies that Camila Rocha and I are conducting may serve as a tool for the democratic field to understand and assimilate, in a broader and deeper way, how big the challenge we are facing is. Data and reflections derived from an academic work conducted with technique and rigor must be urgently comprehended and used, regardless of the political stance of the researchers in charge of the study. The scientific and political arenas must join hands to build more solid democratic foundations. Key arguments of Bolsonarism, such as the anti-political rhetoric, or the construction or exaggeration of an enemy that should instead be seen as a mere political or ideological opponent, must be carefully analyzed and effectively counterargued. Finally, one of the most unequivocal conclusions we have arrived at during all these years of listening to Bolsonaro voters is that they went to the polls feeling abandoned, orphaned, and deeply disappointed and hurt by those who should represent them politically. The average Brazilian feels invisible and mistreated by a political class that, in their view, is far removed from their needs, anxieties, and desires. All of us — who believe democracy is the best path to a fairer, less unequal, more developed country, where we are all free and responsible — must reflect on how we are contributing to this mounting resentment and malaise. A society that feels alone in its pains and that sees politics as the hangman of its future will always be vulnerable to authoritarian and destructive attempts.